Saudi Arab Light.
From $7 a barrel on December 31, 1973, it went to nearly $11 by end-1974, and will have gone to somewhere over $18 by the end of 1979. In real terms, the increase is much less, of course, and it has not gone smoothly.
The unforeseen dollar devaluation put the real price down, to an unintended degree, which is now being made up.
The stagnant demand could for a time be viewed as only an interlude. As recently as two years ago, the consensus view (taking the CIA report as the prime example) was that non-Communist consumption in 1985 would be over 70 million barrels daily, demand on OPEC would be 49 million. These are now seen as massive over-estimates. The Saudi Arab cutback in expansion plans is a direct result.
But the cartel has grown more clumsy these last few years. Formerly, they set the price, and left allocation of output to the oil companies. The companies translated their expected sales of products into a mix of crude liftings from various countries. Surpluses and deficits were small and soon corrected. Today the main producing countries have begun to set production themselves. But their prior decisions cannot, except by chance, equal consumer demand even in total, still less by types and locations. Discrepancies are larger, and not soon correctable; they trigger speculation, which exaggerates the resulting price movements.
Late last year, the cartel was ponderously working out a higher price level, when the Iranian revolution gave them an opportunity and a problem. In nine months, they have still not been able to accomplish a stable higher price level, and a supply-demand balance. However the dust settles, in later years there will be more disturbances, local shortages (and surpluses), speculative run-ups, All in all, if incomes grow by about 3 percent per year, energy growth will probably be less than 2 percent. If we are going into recession, the next five years may be as flat as the last five.
The oil share of energy will probably not decrease much in the next decade.
The future of nuclear power is clouded. Coal will displace some oil, gas even more, but the extent is limited.
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Worldwide, supply elasticity does not greatly differ from zero. In some countries, higher prices do elicit greater supply: an orthodox forward-sloping supply curve. Other countries, the richer they get, the more easy for them to be good cartelists and restrain output. The more they change, the less they produce: a backward-bending curve. In still other countries, both forwardand backward-bending curves are at work.
First, the small but rational part, Communist net exports. They grew from 1 to 1.5 MBD and will probably be higher by the mid-1980's, as the Chinese industry keeps growing and the Soviet Union scrambles to produce or conserve oil to export for scarce foreign resources. Comparative advantage will matter more than "need." Soviet gas growth will at least offset any oil decrease.
But in the world picture, Communist exports will remain very small.
In the non-OPEC non-Communist world the big new factor is Mexico. The recoverable contents of known fields are now so large that the constraint is in how fast one can and will develop. By 1985, Mexico probably could produce 4.5 million barrels daily and half as much gas equivalent. I do not know what they will do. Four years ago their goal was self-sufficiency. Two years ago it was full speed ahead. The current plan is to go from 1.5 up to 2.5 million and pause. The current President leaves office in 1982, and cannot bind his successor. If the Government of Mexico has enough confidence in its ability to cope with large revenue flows, production will go higher. Comparisons with Iran are not appropriate, because Mexican oil and gas revenues are so much smaller a part of the national product.
The United States Government has prevented natural gas sales and avowedly fears that too-rapid growth of Mexican imports would "disrupt our carefully nurtured relationships with the Middle East" (The New York Times, November 30, 1978) . These relationships are carefully left unexplained.
Elsewhere, I can discern no big pleasant or unpleasant surprises. Worldwide, the soaring price has not brought about any surge in drilling. Since contracts were used for bonfires in 1973, risk in many countries is great. If an oil operator loses money, the loss is his; if he makes a good discovery, a dissatisfied landlord rewrites the deal. The World Bank financing of oil and gas development in LDCs may be quite a help to some poor nations--one hopes so--but no more.
In the U.S., high prices mean windfall profits. Half the profits would normally go to the government as income tax. But the American public and government prefer to give up their half if only they can deprive the detested oilman of his half. Other nations have their own version of this rule. Thus the higher price has a political effect which depresses oil exploration and development.
In all countries, oil is thought to have an intrinsic value. The higher the price, the more are people convinced that its real value is even higher than the price. It logically follows that the seller is always conferring a benefit on the buyer. Why do the undeserving foreigner a favor? So the U.S. thinks
Alaskan oil is too good for the Japanese; many in Canada and Mexico think their oil and gas are too good for the Americans; many in Britain think it too good for the Continentals and so on and on. The net result: high prices discourage some oil development in the U.S., Canada, and elsewhere. Again, the backwardbending curve. These are price-taker nations, and their actions are an important help to the OPEC nations. 
III
We turn now to the OPEC nations, joined in a loose but effective federation.
I hear there is no cartel, because supply-demand, "market forces," explain the current price increase. How true: "As agreed at the last OPEC meeting in Geneva, they have trimmed supply in line with the partial restoration of Iranian production.
Object of the cutbacks is to keep the market tight and let the pricing initiative remain with OPEC members." (Oil & Gas Journal, May 21, 1979) .
That sounds like a potent market force. But hear someone in high office at the Department of Energy: "The planet Earth is producing less oil than the people on it want." Thus the scarcity is due to nature; which is to say, the market is competitive. You can believe that if you like. Sometimes the point is made more explicitly:
The OPEC nations are really not accomplishing anything. They "administer" the price and in a tight market an "administered price" rises more slowly.
I complained many years ago that "administered prices" was a catchy phrase signifying nothing. But the devil sees deeper. As Mephistopheles advised the hopeful student, when you have no idea you most need a word. The cartel's price administration allegedly slows an upward price movement "when the market is tight." But who is making the market tight?
There is also a revival or repitition of OGMB (oil in the ground is worth more than money in the bank). In Saudi Arabia today, the production ceiling of 8.5 MBD means that a barrel not lifted today is postponed for 50 to 100 years. Also, the heads of state have been fuming over the high spot prices which allegedly give ideas to the producing nations--the very ones who made the market tight, and forced spot prices skyward. This preoccupation with triva speaks for itself.
Anyway, there is an orthodox view which underlies policy to this and all other consuming countries. The OPEC nations are supposedly willing to produce up to some maximum amount of oil. If we the consumers stay inside that limit--happiness, "enough oil for our needs," stable or maybe even declining real prices.
If we cannot restrain ourselves, disaster. At best, prices will rocket. Worse yet, a dangerous struggle for scarce resources, as nation elbowed nation for the dwindling supply. Now, if oil is allocated by price, however "unfairly," there is no energy gap, no struggle, no problem of "access." But for reasons never revealed, the price is not expected to allocate, even though all logic and experience tell us it has and does and will. Europeans and Japanese are frightened and envious of supposed U.S. "access" and our "special relationships" with producing nations. One would suppose that the experience of the 1973-1974 so-called "embargo," when we were the special enemy and yet did better than Britain and France, the special friends, though not as well as "odiously neutral" Japan, would have taught people a lesson.
Anyway, the idea that there is some fixed limit of output, to which consumers must adapt, turns reality on its head. The cartel core nations do not control the net demand upon them. They do control supply. They react to changes in demand by changing production. But the adaptation is not automatic or smooth. Recently the 9 mechanism has been wound too tight, for anybody's good. There are two reasons:
the diminishing role of the multinational oil companies, and the unexpected shocks to supply. While we shiver over wells drying up, these people repress the surplus.
In mid-April, Iran's output was up to an unexpectedly high 4.7 MBD, prompting Saudi Arabia to promulgate a lower ceiling of 8.5 MBD for the second quarter. But then Iran apparently receded to about 4 MBD. So spot prices again jumped in early
May. By end-June, they had stabilized at record high levels. At the OPEC meeting, Saudi Arabia announced the market crude at $18, up percent in six months. Two weeks later, they agreed to allow another million bd, which means that they are content with $18--for the time being.
Nobody can tell what to expect in Iran. With 7 MBD of capacity, Iran had been a good enough cartel partner to hold output to 5.5 million or even less.
We are now told they will produce only 3.5 million. I expect that a government with effective control of southern Iran will aim at higher production. Oil revenues have been nearly half of the gross domestic product. The country badly needs imported food, raw materials, industrial goods, and parts. Urban unemployment is widespread, and dangerous. There are many claimants for assistance and subsistence.
Hence the target will, I think, go well above 3.5 million. But the expulsion of skilled foreign personnel means that Iran cannot go back to its old production levels.
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Hence out best single-valued estimate might be for only 3.5 MBD, in some such fashion as: We must put aside the ceilings and projections so popular in this town, which forecast OPEC capacity and output as if it were an independent variable.
The OPEC nations will install such capacity, and operate such fractions of it, as suits their interests. With more or less demanded, they will produce more or less--at their price. They can't predict it any better than we.
The economic motive for Saudi output restriction reinforces the political:
The more their revenues and wealth, the greater their political clout. Hear the U.S. Embassy in Jiddah: If we would accede to Saudi Arab wishes "they would give us all the oil we need and at good prices." (Business Week, April 9, 1979).
Maybe they would, for as long as six months--it's possible. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly broken agreements--not because they are bad people but because you cannot compel a sovereign monopolist to keep his word. But the Saudis know the Americans are amenable to this kind of pressure, and will therefore keep pressing.
Iq
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V
The basic problem is simple; and simple problems are the hardest to solve. The Saudis and neighbors and others are fine-tuning a cartel with coarse instruments. Current consumption is poorly measured by the available statistics. Even the production numbers are getting shaky. Supply has to be kept tight despite panic, hoarding, and spot price gyrations, because the controllers fear to lose control. They can handle the large excess of capacity.
They want to avoid the much smaller but dangerous surplus of actual supply, perhaps 2 MBD a year ago, which keeps prices under pressure. That is why we must expect a continuing bumpy ride in the years ahead. When prices are raised, the OPEC nations are willing to make room for Saudi production. As thier expenditures approach income and they run toward or into deficit, they become unwilling to do this and threaten to shove the whole burden on to the Saudis, who resolve the contradiction by raising the price again, to the benefit of themselves and others. Unexpected events like the Iranian revolution are opportunities to be seized, despite these dangers.
In the short run, the cartel is restrained by a desire not to damage world monetary and trading relations. If the price goes to $18, for example, the surplus on current account will by late 1979 be running at $60 billion annual y.L/ That is nominally nearly equal to 1974, a year of recession, but in real terms about a third less.
So long as the price remains below the long-run monopoly optimum, this process will go on, each incident unpredictable. The richer the producing nations, the more easily can they reduce output, and the less the incentive or compulsion k/Adapted from Rimmer de Vries, "Implications of the New Oil Situation," World Financial Markets (Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.), May 1979, table 4, assuming 27 MBD exports.
16 to expand output. So the situation will get better for them, worse for us.
Where the long run optimum monopoly price lies, I do not know. If the cartel is ever perceived as anywhere near it, there is real danger to them.
Without much more room to raise prices to consumers, a valorem tariff on oil must become a deduction from the cartel revenues. The petro-dollar flow could, at the limit, be wholly diverted to consumer-country governments.
-/ These governments have no such intention--far from it! But even a small probability makes the crystal ball cloudy for the late 1980's.
I/For a formal proof see: "Constraints on the World Monopoly Price," Resources & Energy, Vol. I (1978) 5-7, 17-18. 
